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Gatekeeping Post-Uniloc: Expert
Testimony in Multi-Component Patent
Litigation
Erika Mayo*
A strong patent system has historically supported extraordinary growth in
the United States’ technology industry. Striking a balance between patentee
compensation and the public interest in a competitive market, the system, as
envisioned, rewards an inventor only for his contribution to the state of the
art. But current advances in technology typically represent incremental
improvement on prior inventions, and often constitute merely one of
hundreds of components of a device. With device sales in the millions or
billions, it is unsurprising that parties bitterly contest the methodology for
calculation of patent damages. Under the present system, each party is
incentivized to seek out the “best expert money can buy.” Confounded
juries have recently awarded nine and ten figure sums for relatively trivial
contributions. This overcompensation of patentees upsets the intended
balance in the patent system. In recent years, the Federal Circuit has made
an effort to rein in excessive or unfounded patent damages awards. In
Uniloc v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit granted a motion for retrial on the
issue of damages, rejecting the validity of plaintiff’s damages expert
testimony. This note advocates a broad reading of Uniloc and encourages
trial courts to take a greater role in providing juries with sound methodology
for assessing damages. Specifically, this note encourages the use of courtappointed damages experts to restore predictability in the U.S. patent
system.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law. This note was
made possible by the support and guidance of Professor Roger C. Park, for which the author is
humbly grateful. The author also wishes to thank Zach Lloyd and Alfredo Amoedo for their
editorial assistance, and Kerry L. Konrad for everything, always.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology is big business. In 2012, Apple sold more than 100
million iPhones and over 50 million iPads, boasting fourth quarter
revenues of almost $36 billion. 1 Sales of Android devices have been
similarly steady in the billions. 2 Qualcomm, a wireless chip-maker,
has drastically outpaced revenue expectations due to extraordinary
demand. 3 Recent earnings across the technology sector are at an
historic high, and continued growth is expected. 4
A booming American technology industry is arguably due, in
part, to a strong patent system. Indeed the Congressional power to
issue patents stems from its Constitutional mandate to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 5 A patent grants an inventor
the “right to exclude”—the ability to keep others from practicing his
invention for a period of time. This right is also known as a “limited
monopoly.” The limited monopoly is designed as an incentive: The
inventor must disclose his invention to the public in order to obtain
and enforce his rights. 6 In exchange for disclosure, the inventor
enjoys the ability to price his invention in the absence of
The inventor may also choose to transfer this
competition. 7
monopoly right via limited or exclusive licenses. 8 To be effective, this
exchange (or quid pro quo) must balance between promoting
disclosure and protecting the public from unwarranted monopolies.
Embedded in this system is a dated conception of what
constitutes “invention.”
As written, the system envisions the

1. Earnings Releases, APPLE, http://investor.apple.com/results.cfm (last visited Mar. 5,
2013).
2. Eric Zeman, Google Races Toward 1 Billion Activations, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept.
12, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/hardware/handheld/google-races-toward-1-billionandroid-ac/240007197.
3. Sinead Carew, Qualcomm posts higher profits, raises FY targets, REUTERS (Jan. 31,
2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/qualcomm-posts-higher-profit-raises-212248270.html
(“The biggest supplier of cellphone chips reported a profit $1.395 billion, or 81 cents per share,
for its fiscal first-quarter, ended December 25, compared with a profit of $1.17 billion, or 71
cents per share, in the year-ago quarter.”).
4. Jack Hough, Why Tech Stocks Look Better—Even For the Risk Averse, WSJ (Jan. 28,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203363504577186973426913812.html?KE
YWORDS=intel+earnings (“With 37 percent of S&P 500 companies having announced
December-quarter earnings results, 68 percent of the technology companies that have reported
have beaten analysts’ estimates, versus 59 percent for the index and 40 percent for consumerstaples companies, according to a Friday report from Thomson Reuters.”).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. For a discussion of the economics behind the limited monopoly incentive, see generally
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
7. See Demsetz, supra note 6, at 354–55.
8. See id. at 352–53.
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“invention” as a new device or machine. 9 For the Founders, “if you
put technology in a bag and shook it, it would make some noise.” 10 A
recent shift towards intangible and incremental invention, however,
means that modern technology rarely fits the Founders’ description.
Advances are largely in the chemical, biotechnological and software
arenas. Moreover, typical modern technology—the thing that makes
noise when you shake it—is not a stand-alone tool but an amalgam of
many components. Each component can contain components, and so
on. Each part of the greater invention might be the product of a
different inventor, covered by a separate patent or several
overlapping patents. 11
Complex end-user technology products, like Apple’s iPhone, are
comprised of hundreds and even thousands of patentable
components. 12 This market reality raises practical concerns for the
operation of the patent system, which historically envisioned a device
or machine covered by a single patent. 13 More specifically, it has
become increasingly difficult to calculate the true value of a patented
technology for the purpose of negotiating licensing agreements, as
well as assessing appropriate damages for infringement. Similarly,
the “right to exclude” may over-compensate component and
incremental inventors. While the value of a patented technology
should correlate to its incremental contribution to the end-product, 14
[t]he threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will
force the downstream producer to pull its product from the market
can be very powerful. These threats can greatly affect licensing
negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based on a
patent covering one small component of a complex, profitable, and
popular product. 15

With end-product sales in the billions, it is unsurprising that the
methodology for calculation of patent damages has been bitterly

9. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1991, 1992 (2007).
10. Id. at 1991–92 (quoting Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999).
11. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1992.
12. Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 726–27 (2011).
13. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1992.
14. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 639 (2010).
15. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–88 (2007).
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contested. 16 Jury awards for patent infringement have, in recent
years, reached nine and even ten figures. 17 These figures reflect an
average royalty rate of over thirteen percent—significantly higher
than the average negotiated license. 18 Since 2007, observers have
noted efforts by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to “rein
in” astronomical patent damages awards. Under Chief Justice Rader,
the Court has edged its decisions closer to a rational market model
for assessing damages. 19 Specifically, the Court has sought to limit
admissibility of irrelevant sales and market data where such data is
likely to distract or confuse the jury from the proper calculation. 20
In January of 2011, the Federal Circuit granted Microsoft’s
motion for retrial on the issue of damages in Uniloc v. Microsoft,
rejecting on Daubert grounds the validity of expert testimony based
on the “25-percent rule of thumb” for calculating patent damages. 21
Prior to this decision, the rule provided a basis for calculating the
“reasonable royalty” at one-quarter of the total market value of the
product containing the infringing technology. 22 The Uniloc decision
also sought to clarify earlier precedent on admissibility under the socalled “Entire Market Value Rule”; the Court prohibited
introduction of market data where the plaintiff failed to illustrate that
the patented feature created the market demand for the entire
product. 23 As discussed in detail below, Uniloc represents a
substantial shift in the landscape for patent damages calculations.
Implications of the decision have not gone unnoticed: District courts
will be expected to scrutinize expert evidence on the issue of patent
damages for both relevance and reliability.
But Uniloc only provides the outer limits of permissible damages
evidence—what not to do. The damages calculus remains unwieldy in
two primary respects: (1) the Federal Circuit adheres to a nebulous
fifteen-factor “test” for computing damages, 24 and (2), the trial court
enjoys broad discretion in determining the appropriate methodology.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applies the highly deferential “abuse
of discretion” standard, 25 resulting in rarely disturbed, but often
16. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 628.
17. Cotter, supra note 12, at 725–26 (noting that, of nine awards exceeding $100 million
since 2007, not all have survived post-judgment motions or appeal).
18. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2032.
19. Cotter, supra note 12, at 750–51.
20. Id. at 752.
21. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
22. Cotter, supra note 12, at 730.
23. Id. at 732.
24. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629–30. While the author agrees with innumerable
commentators that the Georgia-Pacific test has significant flaws, this note is not focused on a
critique of the governing legal standard.
25. Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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inexplicable, jury awards. 26 What results is a lack of meaningful
appellate guidance and an unpredictable economic landscape. 27
Proper assessment of damages is of the utmost importance in
protecting the validity of our patent system.
Inconsistent
compensation diminishes the economic justification for enforcing
patent rights. 28 While the patent damages problem is widely
recognized, an absence of Congressional consensus has resulted in
little reform. 29 In the wake of Uniloc, this note advocates greater
involvement by the district courts in policing the data presented for
the jury’s consideration. Part II outlines the current state of patent
damages law under the Federal Circuit. Part III discusses expert
testimony in the patent context, and Daubert’s evidentiary
restrictions. Part IV summarizes the Uniloc v. Microsoft decision.
Finally, Part V advocates greater role for Rule 706 experts in an
effort to ensure reasonable damages calculations post-Uniloc.

II. THE PATENT DAMAGES LANDSCAPE
Relevance of certain expert testimony, and the propriety of
court-appointed experts, must be considered in context of the
governing standards for assessing damages. The calculation of
damages for patent infringement is governed by 35 U.S.C. 284, which
states, “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but
in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer.” Courts have long held that damages can
be either the patentee’s lost profits, or the reasonable royalty he
would have received through arm’s-length bargaining. 30 The burden
of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence falls on the
patentee. 31

26. Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We review
the jury’s determination of the amount of damages, as an issue of fact, for substantial evidence.
A jury’s decision with respect to an award of damages must be upheld unless the amount is
grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on
speculation or guesswork.”).
27. Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 472 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 471–72.
30. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
31. Id.
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A. LOST PROFITS
To recover lost profits, a patentee must show that “but for the
infringing acts, the patent owner would have made the sales and
would have made a certain level of profit.” 32 Four elements must be
proved by the patentee to establish entitlement to lost profits: (1) a
demand for the patented product; (2) the absence of an acceptable,
non-infringing substitute for the patented product; (3) the patentee’s
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand for the
patented product; and (4) the amount of profit the patentee would
have expected to make if he had made the infringer’s sales. 33 Lost
profits established by this test are limited by “reasonable, objective
foreseeability,” but can include lost profits for sales of products not
covered by the patent. 34
B. REASONABLE ROYALTY
Where a patentee is unable to show lost profits or an established
royalty rate, he is nevertheless entitled to a reasonable royalty. 35 The
Federal Circuit recognizes several approaches for this calculation,
while conceding that any reasonable royalty analysis is necessarily
uncertain. 36 The court noted that “where an established royalty rate
for the patented inventions is shown to exist, the rate will usually be
adopted as the best measure of reasonable and entire
compensation.” 37 A single licensing agreement is not enough to
demonstrate uniformity or acquiescence in the reasonableness of the
rate. 38 Licenses negotiated in the face of a threat of litigation are
similarly not sufficient to provide an “established” rate. 39
The most common approach to assessing damages is the
“hypothetical negotiation,” which attempts to determine what the
parties would have agreed upon, had they negotiated an arm’s-length
license at the time of infringement. 40 The hypothetical negotiation
assumes that the patent is valid and infringed, and tries to “recreate
32. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
33. Id.
34. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–67 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
35. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
36. Id. at 1324–25.
37. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing
Tektronix, Inc., v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1078–79.
40. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
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the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the
resulting agreement.” 41 The Federal Circuit has adopted the GeorgiaPacific framework for analyzing patent damages, which consists of a
fifteen-factor test. 42 Under this test, the trial court must consider
“sound economic proof of the nature of the market” and the claimed
invention’s value therein. 43
The hypothetical negotiation is flexible. A court may look to
“events and facts that occurred [after the time infringement began]
and that could not have been known to or predicted by the
hypothesized negotiators.” 44 Importantly, the Georgia-Pacific factors
are nonexclusive and each factor may not apply to every case. 45 In
every case, however, the patentee must give evidence “tending to
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentees
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features,
and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural
While the defendant is presumed, in the
or speculative.” 46
hypothetical negotiation, to be a “willing licensee,” the law “does not
require that an infringer be permitted to make a profit.” 47 Further, a
patentee’s demonstrated unwillingness to grant an unlimited license
may support a higher award. 48
Though beyond the scope of this note, it should be recognized
that the existing damages standards have been roundly attacked. 49
Courts have described the royalty calculation as “‘involv[ing] more
the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.’” 50 At best, the
present standards are complex and open to competing
interpretations. This complexity invites parties to fashion their
analyses to reach an optimal number by selecting which factors to
include. Under the current system, a jury might hear competing

41.
42.
43.
44.

Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325.
Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1077.

ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
45. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575.
46. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
47. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Erick S. Lee, Reconsidering Reasonable Royalty Damages Methodology in

Patent Infringement Suits: Supplementing Georgia Pacific with the Reasonable Royalty
Determination Board, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 104 (2010) (“The Georgia Pacific

test has been criticized for its difficulty in applicability, and the concern that consequently
patentees are not adequately compensated for the infringement.”).
50. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 38 (2001).
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damages theories based on entirely inconsistent inclusion of factors,
any number of which they may properly consider.

III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
Section 284 expressly provides for the use of expert testimony
“as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would
be reasonable under the circumstances.” Given the complexity of this
assessment, juries often rely on calculations put forth by the parties’
experts in arriving at an award. It is thus no surprise that expert
testimony is a prominent feature of nearly every patent trial. 51 Many
patent cases call for both accounting experts and industry and
licensing experts. 52 Additional experts, including economists, may be
employed depending on the theory of damages advanced at trial. 53
Under the common law, admissibility of expert testimony was
analyzed under the “general acceptance” standard. To be admitted
under that standard, the methodology leading to an expert’s opinion
had to be “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs.” 54
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975. Rule 702
provides the general standard for admission of expert testimony:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case. 55

Adoption of Rule 702 resulted in a conflict as to whether
“general acceptance” remained the correct standard. In 1993, in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court
51. Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AIPLA Q. J. 1,
1, 3 (1999).
52. Id. at 17. (“For example, where a reasonable royalty is sought the licensing or industry
expert will testify to the royalty rate and the proper methodology of computing royalties. The
accountant, if retained, will then perform the actual calculations.”).
53. Id.
54. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
55. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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found that Frye had been displaced by the Federal Rules. 56 In
Daubert, minors and their guardians sued a pharmaceutical company
for birth defects allegedly resulting from the mothers’ ingestion of the
drug Bendectin. 57 The defendant provided testimony of an expert on
the “risks from exposure to various chemical substances.” 58 The
expert stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and
human birth defects and no study had found Bendectin capable of
causing birth defects. 59
The plaintiffs provided contradictory testimony from eight of
their own experts. These experts based their opinions on test tube
and live animal studies, chemical comparisons, and a reanalysis of
published statistical studies. 60 The district court found that these
experts’ opinions would not be admissible under the “generally
accepted” test and granted the defendant’s motion. 61 The Supreme
Court ultimately reversed, finding that “nothing in the text of [Rule
702] establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to
admissibility.” 62 The Court also held, however, that Rule 702 places
limits on the admissibility of expert evidence. The trial judge was
accordingly assigned the role of gatekeeper. As such, the judge “must
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant, but reliable.”
Before admitting scientific 63 expert testimony, the judge must
apply a two-part test: (1) “[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must
be ‘scientific knowledge’”, and (2) the expert testimony must “assist”
the trier of fact. 64 The first requirement relates to trustworthiness,
while the second is directed to relevance. Expert testimony must be
“relevant to the task at hand”—it must “fit” the facts of the case. To
apply this validity/reliability test, Daubert encourages the court to
consider four non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the expert’s method
has been tested; (2) the reliability of the expert’s method and its
potential rate of error; (3) whether the method has been published,
and/or the subject of peer review; and finally (4) whether the method
is generally accepted in a relevant scientific community. 65 These
56. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
57. Id. at 582.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 583.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 588.
63. Id. at 579, 590 n. 8 (1993). In a footnote, the Daubert Court elucidated the parameters
of its holding, stating: “Rule 702 also applies to ‘technical, or other specialized knowledge.’ Our
discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered
here.” Id.
64. Id. at 592.
65. Id. at 593–94.
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considerations are designed to safeguard the jury from “absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions,” while avoiding undue restraint
on the search for truth.
The Court elucidated its Daubert holding in General Electric Co.
v. Joiner. The appropriate standard of review on Daubert rulings was
deemed to be the “abuse of discretion” standard. 66 The Court also
reaffirmed the need for experts to sufficiently tie methodology to the
facts of the case. 67 An expert’s bare assertion that this requirement is
satisfied may be insufficient; 68 “nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert.” 69 The trial court has discretion to rule that there is “simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.” 70 Two years later, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
the Court extended the Daubert gatekeeping mandate to nonscientific expert evidence. 71 Validity and reliability of an expert’s
methodology must be reviewed regardless of whether the expert is a
“technical,” “experience-based,” or “scientific” expert. 72
Experts testify in a majority of civil jury trials. 73 In most cases,
experts are proffered by both sides. Even with the Rule 702 and
Daubert safeguards, there can be no guarantee of the validity of
expert testimony. 74 On the contrary, expert testimony continues to be
viewed with a cautious eye. More cautious, some argue, than other
testimony received at trial. There are several reliability dangers
specific to expert testimony. 75 Professor Samuel R. Gross provides a
“thumbnail sketch” of the method of use of expert testimony,
illustrating the need for skepticism:
The lawyers on each side of a dispute, acting in secret, choose
people from an almost indefinitely large array and designate them
66. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
72. Id.
73. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991).
74. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (holding that the judge must
make a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts in issue.”). i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854 (2010).
75. Gross, supra note 73, at 1114–15 (“Reading the comments of lawyers and judges, it is
easy to get the impression that expert witnesses are intruders who disrupt the judicial search for
truth. This is false, of course. As Karl Menninger pointed out, the expert ‘is not self invited to
these parties. He is not a trespasser. He is called, then he is questioned, criticized, disputed,
attacked, suspected, disregarded and ridiculed.’ The expert witness that lawyers vilify is a
creature of their own creation.”).
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as the witnesses; these witnesses are paid handsomely for their
testimony; lawyers can preemptively hire witnesses in order to keep
them from testifying when their honest testimony might help the
other side; many witnesses make a business of testifying, and
advertising their services; the attorneys control the information and
the issue on which their witnesses testify; witnesses are allowed to
testify to matters beyond their personal knowledge and to evaluate
as well as present information; the existing rules of pretrial
discovery are curtailed so that the identity and the evidence of
many potential witnesses can be concealed from the opposing
party; the usual rules of evidence are inapplicable at trial; and,
finally, the subject matter of the testimony by these witnesses is
intrinsically confusing, if not incomprehensible, to judges and
jurors. 76

This system allows for the grooming of witnesses for the benefit
of one party, while accepting these witnesses to be presented to the
jury as learned specialists. The road to a civil trial is thus akin to a
bidding war—each side is incentivized to procure the best testimony
money can buy. This problem is compounded by the fact that a
majority of expert testimony is given by testifying experts who are
“repeat players,” 77 familiar with the grooming and adversarial
processes. Many are more familiar, even, than the lawyers doing the
questioning. 78 Where the damages stakes are high, it is understood
that both parties will shell out substantial sums for the “right” expert
testimony.
Studies have shown that juries are likely to attribute substantial
weight to the opinions of experts. 79 Laypersons are accustomed to
receiving advice from experts, and relying on that advice as sound. 80
Outside the courtroom, when faced with a question about which one
has no background or experience, the guidance of an expert is
undoubtedly warranted. The jury brings this understanding of an
expert—the neutral, guiding specialist—to trial, where experts are not
paid to be neutral. While some argue that the adversarial system is
enough to dispel these dangers, the unique circumstance of the expert
witness casts doubt on this proposition. Experts are selected, in large
part, because they are convincing. 81 A low-credibility expert is
76. Gross, supra note 73, at 1125.
77. Id. at 1191,
78. Id. (“Judging from 1985-86 cases, when an attorney examines a witness in a civil jury
trial in California, the expert is twice as likely to have testified in another such case in the
preceding six months as the attorney is to have tried one (42 percent to 21 percent).”).
79. Jane Goodman, Edith Green & Elizabeth F. Loftus., What Confuses Jurors in Complex
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65 (1985).
80. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 176 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 183–84 (2010).
81. RICHARD LEMPERT, CIVIL JURIES AND COMPLEX CASES: TAKING STOCK AFTER
TWELVE YEARS 9 (Ctr. for Research on Soc. Org. Working Paper Series, November 1992),
available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51254/5/488_1.pdf.
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unlikely to be called to the stand. 82 Moreover, an attack on the
witness’s academic credibility may not be enough to discredit his
convincing methodology or conclusion, however erroneous.
Expert testimony dangers are of particular concern in a damages
determination. The jury is here not asked to decide a yes or no
question such as “Brakes failed or didn’t they? Pill caused defect, or
didn’t it?” Instead, the jury is asked to come up with a value. That
value need not match the findings of either party’s expert. 83 An
adversarial attack on an expert’s credibility thus provides little aid to
the jury in determining the proper figure. Unlike in a yes-or-no
scenario, the mere fact that one party’s witness is “wrong” does not
necessarily mean the other party’s witness is “right.” The average
juror, who has never been party to a licensing agreement, is left to
fend for himself. The jury’s befuddlement is often apparent. For
example, in Lucent v. Gateway, the jury awarded $357,693,056.18 in
lump-sum damages, suggesting at the very least their
misunderstanding of the “lump-sum” versus “running royalty” award
(a lump-sum agreement would almost never contain a number out to
the penny). 84 On appeal, the Federal Circuit is often left to speculate
as to how the jury arrived at its figure. 85
Flawed expert testimony can be dangerous in another way. By
presenting the jury with a complex set of data, organized convincingly
to result in a quantitative conclusion, the expert can obfuscate the
assumptions underlying his calculation.
One example of this
phenomenon is the frequently invoked “Nash bargaining” theory. 86
Nash bargaining attempts to quantify the economic values underlying
a hypothetical negotiation and solve for what portion of the gains
achieved through agreement would be allotted to each party. 87 To
explain Nash bargaining, the expert assigns letters or mathematical
symbols to reflect (1) the value of the patented feature (as compared
to the next-best alternative), (2) the margin (or net profit) on each
patented unit, (3) the strength of the patent (probability that it will be
found valid and infringed), 88 (4) the cost of redesigning the end82. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33(4) SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 907 (2003).

83. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs, 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A
court is not restricted in finding a reasonable royalty to a specific figure put forth by one of the
parties.”).
84. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
85. See, e.g., Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the
jury may have “used the $19 billion figure to ‘check’ its significant award of $388,000,000.”).
86. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1995–96 (referring to Nash Bargaining as a
“standard economic theory”).
87. Id.
88. Id. While the reasonable royalty calculation assumes the patent is valid and infringed, it
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product to avoid reading on the patent, 89 (5) the percentage of the
infringer’s sales that would be lost by issuance of an injunction, 90 and
finally (6) the bargaining skill of the patent holder. 91 Importantly,
bargaining skill is expressed as a “fraction of the combined gains from
settling (or licensing), rather than litigating.” 92 The greater the
bargaining skill of the patentee, the more he recoups of that
combined gain. A common underlying assumption is that the parties
bring equal bargaining power to the negotiation (expressed as a
percentage, or 0.5). 93 Of course, there are innumerable reasons why
parties would not bring equal bargaining power to the table.
Nevertheless, this assumption is built into the equation—literally
buried in Greek. The jury is presented with a complex mathematical
structure containing a significant yet unfounded assumption. 94
One scholar summarizes the added problem that juries are
tempted to offset apparent biases: “If the task were to estimate the
value of coins in a jar, and one partisan expert said ‘$50’ and the other
partisan expert said ‘$100,’ a fact-finder might reasonably believe that
the true value is around $75. However, this tactic breaks down
whenever one expert is more honest than the other. Indeed, the
tactic punishes such honesty.” 95 Another scholar notes:
The patentee’s expert will opine that every penny the infringer ever
made was due to the patent. The infringer’s expert will opine that
since the infringer did not really need the patent anyway a
reasonable royalty would be a flat fee somewhere in the
neighborhood of pocket change. 96

The fear that a jury will “split the difference” may discourage
hired experts from exercising restraint in their opinions. The result is
extraordinary divergence in the values proposed by the parties.
Most jury damages awards have been upheld on appeal. 97
Recently, the Federal Circuit has illustrated an effort to curb expert
testimony that attempts to introduce irrelevant or speculative
evidence in assessing patent damages. In 2010, in Lucent v. Gateway,
would not be possible for the negotiating parties to know this with any degree of certainty
absent litigation.
89. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1995–96.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Nash
bargaining solution would invite a miscarriage of justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption
in an impenetrable facade of mathematics.”).
95. Robertson, supra note 80, at 191.
96. Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein In The GeorgiaPacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).
97. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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the Federal Circuit reviewed the jury’s award of over $357 million as
a “reasonable royalty” for an infringing component of Microsoft
Outlook. Outlook is a successful software program for creating
computer spreadsheets. The component at issue was the “datepicker” function of Outlook, which allows users to employ a dropdown menu in lieu of keyboard entry. 98 The total dollar value of the
sales for the infringing software program was approximately $8
billion. 99 Lucent’s expert based the damages calculation on 8 percent
of sales revenue for the software, and it asked the jury to award
$561.9 million. 100 Microsoft’s expert opined that a lump-sum payment
of $6.5 million would have resulted from a hypothetical negotiation. 101
Notably, because Microsoft had failed to object to introduction
of Lucent’s expert evidence at trial, the court was limited in Lucent to
a review of the jury’s award under the more demanding “substantial
evidence” standard. 102 The court nevertheless held that the damages
award was not supported by the evidence. The court found that
Lucent’s expert had incorrectly urged the jury to speculate as to what
the proper lump-sum damages award would be. 103 The court further
held that Lucent’s had improperly relied upon unrelated prior license
agreements. The court stated “the law does not require an expert to
convey all his knowledge to the jury about each license agreement in
evidence, but a lump-sum damages award cannot stand solely on
evidence which amounts to little more than a recitation of royalty
numbers . . . .” 104
Soon after, in ResQNet.com, the Federal Circuit found that
admission of expert testimony based upon the patentee’s prior
licenses for unrelated patents was an abuse of discretion. 105 The
defendant’s expert had similarly introduced licenses with insufficient
relationship to the claimed invention “to drive the royalty rate up to
unjustified double-digit levels.” 106

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Lucent Technologies, Inc., 580 F.3d at 1317.
Id. at 1323.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1329.
ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868–70, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Id. at 870.
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IV. UNILOC V. MICROSOFT
The Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp. emphasized and clarified the more stringent
standards for expert testimony on patent damages. In Uniloc, the

court again reviewed a multimillion dollar damage award based on a
hypothetical negotiation. Uniloc’s patent covered a system of
deterring software copying through the use of “product keys.” 107
Product keys allow for remote user monitoring by creating a unique
“ID” for each user upon registration. 108 The information used to
create this ID is shared with the vendor’s system. Each time the
application is loaded, the ID on the user’s computer is compared with
the legitimate ID stored in the vendor’s system. 109 Use of the
software can accordingly be restricted where copying is identified. 110
Uniloc’s expert employed the 25 percent “rule of thumb” to set
the baseline for the royalty calculation. 111 The expert testified that
the “rule of thumb” had “been accepted by Courts as an appropriate
methodology in determining damages, in [his] experience, in other
cases.” 112 Microsoft had challenged the 25 percent rule in limine and
attempted to exclude this testimony. 113 Despite noting “the concept
of a ‘rule of thumb’ is perplexing in an area of the law where
reliability and precision are deemed paramount,” the district court
denied Microsoft’s motion because the 25 percent rule had been
The 25 percent rule “approximates” the
widely accepted. 114
reasonable royalty rate that the manufacturer would be willing to
offer during a hypothetical negotiation. The rule supposes a licensee
would pay a royalty rate equivalent to 25 percent of its expected
profits for the product that incorporates the patent. 115
In addition to applying the 25 percent rule, Uniloc’s expert
testified that he had “checked” his findings against the total revenue
for Microsoft’s Office and Windows products—approximately $19
billion. 116 Microsoft also objected to this portion of the expert’s
testimony, arguing that it constituted a misapplication of the Entire
107. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1311 (“hypothesizing that 25 percent of the value of the product would go to the
patent owner and the other 75 percent would remain with Microsoft, resulting in a baseline
royalty rate of $2.50 per license”).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1312.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1311.
116. Id. at 1312.
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Market Value Rule (“EMVR”). 117 On this issue, the district court
agreed, and granted Microsoft’s motion for a new trial on damages. 118
Under the EMVR, a patentee may base its reasonable royalty on
the full commercial value of the device containing the infringing
component; the total revenue for the infringing product becomes the
baseline for application of the relevant Georgia-Pacific factors. 119
The EMVR has “typically been applied to include in the
compensation base unpatented components of a device when the
unpatented and patented components are physically part of the same
machine,” but may include separate components where, together with
the patented components, they constitute “a functional unit.” 120 “For
the [EMVR] to apply, the patentee must prove that the patent-related
feature is the ‘basis for consumer demand,’” that is to say, the reason
consumers purchase the whole product. 121 The Federal Circuit has
also allowed application of the EMVR where the patented feature
“substantially creates the value of the component parts.” 122
Microsoft argued that Uniloc’s expert’s pie chart, which
contained the total revenue number, and Uniloc’s attorneys’
“belittlement of Microsoft’s expert’s royalty figure as representing
only .0003 percent of total revenue” constituted improper invocation
of the EMVR. 123 Neither party sought to show whether the product
keys covered by the patent “created the basis for customer demand or
substantially created the value of the component parts.” 124
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dispensed with the 25 percent rule
as a matter of law, holding that it is a “fundamentally flawed tool for
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation” that
is “inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case
at issue.” 125 The court emphasized that “one major determinant of
whether an expert should be excluded under Daubert is whether he
has justified the application of a general theory to the facts of the
case.” 126 Because the 25 percent rule does not shed light on any
“particular hypothetical negotiation or reasonable royalty involving
any particular technology, industry, or party,” the court found that

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1312.
Id.
Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550.
Id.
Id. at 1549.
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336.
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1321.
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1315.
Id. (emphasis added).
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any expert testimony relying on the rule should be deemed
inadmissible. 127
The Federal Circuit also held that the expert’s use of a $19 billion
“check” was improper under the EMVR. 128 The court highlighted the
case as an “example of the danger of admitting consideration of the
entire market value of the accused where the patented component
does not create the basis for customer demand,” because “[t]he $19
billion cat was never put back into the bag even by Microsoft’s crossexamination of [the expert] . . . .” 129
The Uniloc decision concludes that the proper damages
methodology must be an “economically coherent hypothetical
negotiation tied to the Georgia-Pacific factors and grounded in the
facts of the particular case.” 130 But the “economically coherent”
standard is amenable to competing interpretations. Moreover, the
court’s reaffirmation of the Georgia-Pacific fifteen-factor test will
allow parties to continue to present juries with competing “apples-tooranges” analyses. While stricter scrutiny of expert testimony is a
widely anticipated result of Uniloc, 131 it remains to be seen what
evidence will meet the court’s new requirements. 132 “Sufficiently
relevant facts may be hard to find; and the costs to patent holders for
the economic analysis are likely to be high.” 133 If Uniloc provides
defendants with any safeguard against the dangers of expert
testimony and the threat of “runaway damages awards,” 134 it is an
emphasis on the gate-keeping function of the judge. To have a lasting
effect, trial judges must read Uniloc to invite a more active role of the
court in shaping the appropriate damages analysis.

127. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318.
128. Id. at 1320.
129. Id. at 1320.
130. Roy J. Epstein, Phd, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringement Damages After Uniloc,
39 AIPLA Q. J. 3, 13 (2011).
131. Id. at 160 (“As a result of these decisions, expert testimony on the amount of a
reasonable royalty should be subject to higher evidentiary standards. Benchmark licenses will
require more careful proof of comparability, and the 25 percent rule will no longer be ‘on call’
as a surrogate comparable license.”); see also Thomas Cotter, Reconsidering the GeorgiaPacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1661.
132. Farrand, Weisberg, Killworth & Shapiro, Reform Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The
Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357 (2011).
133. Id. at 449.
134. Id.
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V. GATEKEEPING POST-UNILOC AND THE RULE 706
SOLUTION
Uniloc has received substantial attention as well as citation.
Several courts have expressly acknowledged the heightened review of
expert testimony. 135 Heightened scrutiny has resulted in exclusion of
expert methodologies deemed to be attempts to couch inadmissible
assumptions as accepted science. 136 However, expert testimony
dangers linger even in this more stringent landscape. With fifteen
factors to choose from, parties can still tailor the damages analysis to
support unreasonable awards. 137
Following Uniloc, trial judges should take a more active role in
shaping the damages methodology. One available option is courtappointment of a testifying expert under Federal Rule of Evidence
706. The district courts have too long ignored the Rule 706 expert as
a viable tool in achieving this oversight. In Daubert, the Supreme
Court specifically pointed to Rule 706, which allows the court to enlist
an expert of its own choosing:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The
court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties,
and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert
witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness
consents to act . . . . A witness so appointed shall advise the parties
of the witness’ findings, if any; the witness’ deposition may be taken
by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court
or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness. 138

The Rule is interpreted to provide for both technical advisors
and testifying expert witnesses. Technical advisors have already been
widely used in patent litigation for the purpose of educating the
court. 139 Court appointed testifying witnesses, however, are very
rarely employed.
135. Inventio v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06-CV-5377, 2011 WL 335905 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 23,
2011) (McMahon, J.) (“to get the expert’s testimony to the jury, his evidence must comport with
what seems to me a rather exacting standard”).
136. Oracle, 798 F. Supp 2d at 1120.
137. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629. (“With fifteen factors, lawyers can make an
argument that some combination of factors will support virtually any number an expert (or a
jury) might come up with. As long as juries have virtual carte blanche to pick a damages
number, plaintiffs will continue to have an incentive to shoot for the moon, and the problems of
excessive damages will continue.”)
138. FED. R. EVID. 706.
139. Dolly Wu, Patent Litigation: What About Qualification Standards for Court Appointed
Experts? B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 91501 (2010) (“During 2005-2006, special masters
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Before adoption of the Federal Rules, many supported the use of
court-appointed experts to facilitate both judges’ and juries’
understanding of scientific and technical evidence. 140 In 1920, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the trial court’s
authority under the common law to appoint such experts. 141 Courtappointed witnesses offer several benefits over those appointed by
the parties. First and foremost, the appointed expert has no
allegiance, subconscious or otherwise, to either party. 142 Rather than
hiding the ball from experts they fear will conclude unfavorably, the
parties both contribute to informing a court-appointed expert of the
underlying facts and data. In this way, a single expert is given
competing hypotheses to evaluate, instead of molding his opinion to
meet the needs of his employer.
Despite these apparent benefits, application of Rule 706 has
been limited. 143 A 1993 study conducted for the Federal Judicial
Center sought to determine why judges so rarely make use of this
tactic. Many of the judges responding to that study expressed
concern that appointing an expert would disrupt the adversarial
process. Courts have also expressed concern that the “aura” of a
court-appointment would unduly influence the jury. 144 This concern
is heightened where the factual assessment can be readily applied by
laypersons. 145
Courts should not hesitate to appoint Rule 706 experts in the
face of astronomically divergent patent damages conclusions.
Assessing a reasonable royalty requires consideration of economic
factors with which an average juror is rarely familiar. The reality of a
licensing negotiation—a licensing negotiation over a component of a
component of a component of a technology product—is not “within
the comprehension of laypersons.” Section 284 so acknowledges, by
expressly providing for the use of experts. To properly envision a
“hypothetical negotiation,” the jury should be provided an objective
set of data, rather than two equally unreasonable vignettes. The
danger of a “trial by expert” is similarly abated in the patent damages
addressed claim construction matters in about 41 percent of 90 cases and infringement or
invalidity in about 20 percent of the 90 cases.”)
140. Sophia Cope, Ripe For Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the
Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2003).
141. Id.
142. Gross, supra note 73, at 1220.
143. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Wolfgang, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role
for Court-Appointed Experts in Asessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1005 (1994).
144. See, e.g., Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (“The
presence of a court-sponsored witness, who would most certainly create a strong, if not
overwhelming, impression of ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity,’ could potentially transform a trial
by jury into a trial by witness.”)
145. Id.
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context. The jury need not reach the same value, or even employ the
same methodology, as any expert. 146 Thus the Rule 706 expert can
effectively assist without encroaching on (or usurping) the province of
the fact-finder.
Where complex end-user technology is at issue, the propriety of
a court-appointed expert is arguably even greater. In calculating
damages for component inventions, the reasonable royalty calculation
requires apportionment between the patented and non-patented
elements of the infringing product. 147 To objectively evaluate the
contribution of the patented component to the overall value of the
invention, economic evidence and consumer surveys may be
required. 148 Importantly, consideration of other patented features
should serve to limit the award. In the adversarial expert system,
however, juries rarely hear this crucial evidence. 149 As a result,
reasonable royalty awards for single components are only modestly
less than awards for patents covering the entire infringing product. 150
An appointed expert lacks the adversarial incentives to withhold
evidence of other patented features. 151 Accordingly, juries are more
likely to be presented with all of the relevant data by an appointed
expert.
Use of a Rule 706 expert also allows the trial judge to maintain a
greater degree of control over the methodology for calculating
damages. In the typical adversarial expert scenario, the parties may
offer expert testimony on the basis of completely different sets of
Georgia-Pacific factors. 152 As a result, the jury cannot make an

146. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
147. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 2023.
148. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 2024.
149. Id. (“Practically, it is not clear that parties have either the ability or the incentive o
introduce evidence that other patented components contribute to a product’s success. . . . The
patentee will not introduce such evidence because it would only reduce the royalty rate. The
accused infringer will often not introduce it because the firm does not want to admit that it
might be infringing other patented inventions.”)
150. Id. at 2034 (“The royalty rate for components is approximately 10.0 percent, compared
with 13.1 percent for all inventions . . . but this difference is fairly modest. To see just how
modest, consider that the reduction in royalty rate for component inventions is equivalent to a
conclusion that there are on average less than 1.5 components in a multi-component invention.
Obviously, this does not reflect the commercial reality.”)
151. One consideration that should be acknowledged is cost. Consumer surveys and
compilation of relevant data does not come cheap. Pursuant to the Rule, the cost of an
appointed expert may be borne “by the parties in the proportion and at the time the court
directs.” FED. R. EVID. 706. Thus the court is free, in appointing an expert, to apportion costs
at its discretion. Courts should carefully assess the facts and needs of each case in determining
what costs may reasonably be incurred by the appointed expert and passed through to the
parties.
152. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629.
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apples-to-apples comparison of the data presented at trial. The Rule
706 expert, incorporating evidence provided by both parties,
alleviates the jury’s need to sift through unreasonable positions.
Following Uniloc, at least one court has elected to ameliorate the
problem of warring experts through the use of a court-appointed
expert. 153 In that instance, the range of expert-derived damages was
“as much as $6.1 billion” (plaintiff) and “27.8 million” (defendant). 154
The court noted, “far from complicating the jury’s decision on
damages, the testimony of a 706 expert would assist the jury by
providing a neutral explanation and viewpoint.” 155
Rule 706 affords the court a high degree of discretion and does
not expressly provide for a standard of qualification for a court
appointed expert. 156 On the issue of patent damages, a courtappointed expert should be held to a heightened standard of
experience or specialization than those appointed by the parties. The
reasons for a heightened standard are twofold: (1) the court must be
mindful of the public trust in the court’s truth-seeking function, and
(2) as noted above, an appointed witness may greatly influence the
jury.
Party appointed witnesses who testify on patent damages have
diverse backgrounds. Some are economists or professors who claim
expertise in bargaining theories. Others are attorneys or other
advisors who have participated in licensing negotiations. Appropriate
skills will vary with the facts of each case. In all cases, however, the
court should seek to appoint an expert whose field of research or skill
directly relates to the underlying questions. Failure to properly
“match” the expert with the task at hand can have embarrassing
effects on credibility. In Uniloc, for example, the court noted that
“upon further questioning, [Uniloc’s expert] revealed that he had
been involved in only four or five non-litigation related negotiations,
and had recommended the 25 percent rule only once in a case
involving a power tool.” Thus the credibility of the expert and his
methodology can be called into question by the parties’ failure to
“match” skills with the facts to be determined. The trial court, with
no stake in the ultimate opinion of the expert to be employed, is in a
better position to assess the soundness of methodology and the
proper fit for the case at hand.

153. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. No. 10 CV 03561 Dkt. No. 413 (2011) (Alsup, J.)
(“The starkly conflicting expert testimony led to appointment under Rule 706 of an
independent expert to testify as to damages.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. But note, at the time of this writing, Oracle is still pending trial.
156. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. No. 10 CV 03561 Dkt. No. 413 (2011)
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VI. CONCLUSION
Restoring certainty in damages recovery is crucial to the goals of
the patent system. Importantly, both over and under compensation
are present in the current landscape. 157 Where patentees are undercompensated, the prospective infringer may be better off infringing
than taking a license. 158 This scenario runs directly counter the quid
pro quo, which seeks to reward inventors through a limited
monopoly.
On the other hand, when patentees are overcompensated, the social costs of the patent system increase. 159 An
efficient patent system, consistent with the Constitutional mandate,
would strike a balance between “preserving incentives for the initial
inventor and minimizing the detrimental impact to subsequent
improvers.” 160
The appointment of credible, neutral experts will not only aid the
jury in determining the appropriate compensation for infringement,
but may serve to usher the parties towards a reasonable settlement.
The economic justifications for the patent system require certain and
swift enforcement of the patentees rights. To restore balance in the
quid pro quo, the current damages landscape requires greater judicial
oversight. Uniloc is an invitation for the district courts to provide
exactly that.

157. Cotter, supra note 12, at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id. Noting that, in addition to the social cost in over-compensating the patentee,
“inflated damages awards may threaten to over-deter would-be users from lawfully designing
around in ways that come close to, but do not, constitute infringement.”
160. Landers, supra note 21, at 505.

